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INITIATIVE ENIGMAS
RICHARD COLLINS*
To comment on Professor Amar's paper, I wish to return'to the
subject of the initiative method of amending state constitutions. 1
This is much on the minds of people in this state, as in Oregon and
California. We too have ever lengthening ballots and a legislature of
shrinking importance.
I.
Professor Amar argued that the initiative does not violate the
Guarantee Clause because the essential aspect of republican
government is majority rule, and because Madison's most famous
text contradicting him can be explained away.2 Judge Linde vigor-
ously argued the contrary and urged modern courts to invalidate at
least some kinds of initiatives under the Guarantee Clause.3
First put the question in Borkist form and ask whether the
initiative violates framers' intent for the Guarantee Clause. Profes-
sor Amar discussed framers' meaning extensively, and both Judge
Linde and Professor Eule4 made opposing arguments. Each of them
assumed a unitary meaning of republican in the framers' discourse.
I have doubts.
If we ask whether the initiative would be a satisfactory part of
the republican government the framers were crafting, the answer is
surely no. Professor Amar stressed many framers' references to
majority rule. It is beyond argument that there must be ultimate
majority rule. But most of the hard problems in creation of the U. S.
Constitution lay between the poles of immediate majority rule and
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. The initiative is used to enact statutes, too, but in most states its use to amend
constitutions dwarfs the former in number and importance, and presents harder prob-
lems about republican government.
2. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
749 (1994) (this issue).
3. See Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994) (this issue).
4. See Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives,
and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COW. L. REV. 733 (1994) (this issue).
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ultimate majority rule. Federalist Number 10, which Professor Amar
attempted to isolate, was Madison's recognition of the tension
between majority rule and another fundamental principle of
republicanism, consent of the governed. 5 Consent is strained for
those who regularly lose majoritarian contests. Madison's solution
was complex structure to avoid any group consistently losing out.
The centerpiece was separation of powers augmented by interbranch
checks. Thus the theme of Number 10 reappears in Numbers 48 and
51, where separation is explained. This is one of many reasons why
Number 10 cannot be isolated.6
Most of the framers, Madison included, supported a strong and
independent role for state governments. Indeed, federalism was
viewed as one of the important structural protections for minorities.
It is one thing to conclude that the framers would not accept the
initiative as republican enough for a government they were creating.
And they might have refused to accept the initiative in the proposed
constitution of a new state seeking admission to the union, because
admission is a discretionary act.
It is quite another matter to say the framers would agree that
the federal government had authority to override an existing state
government that peacefully added initiative to its institutions.
Concepts of federalism and state sovereignty would lead to a
different outcome. Furthermore, some historical references to the
Guarantee Clause appear to tie it to the clauses that follow it in
Article IV, relating to insurrection. Under those readings, one of
which is Hamilton's, only violence can justify federal intervention in
the affairs of a sovereign state. 7
In other words, the framers' view of republican government
conflicted with their respect for state sovereignty. The folks who
adopted the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments would surely have
allowed peaceful adoption of the initiative by a state, even if they
thought it insufficiently republican for their own creations. To the
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
6. See also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 17-20 (1972) (summarizing other framers' distinctions between
democracy and republicanism); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS
OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 7, 12-20 (1989) (same).
In several places, Professor Amar's paper did distinguish between ordinary
government and ultimate power of the majority. However, the constitutional initiative
as used in American states today is very much a device of ordinary government, more so
all the time. Thus I may not disagree with him on this point.
7. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 64, 67.
INITIATIVE ENIGMAS
framers, most' state governments in 1787 were deficient. Two still
had royal charters. Yet it is exceedingly unlikely that the framers
intended to authorize immediate federal correction of state
governments not sufficiently republican.8
• This reading is supported by subsequent events. During Dorr's
Rebellion in Rhode Island, there was an extended debate about the
meaning of republican form. Madisonian stability was invoked by
the Charterists against the Dorrites' claim based on republican
principles. The federal government, including the Court, sided with
the existing state government against the Dorrites' very strong
Guarantee Clause claim.9 Professor Amar's explanation for this
apparent contradiction is unconvincing. 10 The federal position is
more naturally understood as deference to-existing state government
rather than as a substantive judgment about republicanism.During the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Guarantee Clause
was repeatedly invoked in support of the most intrusive remedies
against southern intransigence. Most members of Congress, when
they appreciated the limitless power claimed under the clause,
retreated into a passive stance.11
We see the same division of meaning during the era when the
initiative was adopted. In an 1891 decision, the Court expressed
Madisonian scorn for "sudden impulses of mere majorities." 12 But
that was obiter. When the validity of the initiative was before them
in 1912, they ducked. 13
So I read original intent to reject the claim that the Guarantee
Clause invalidates the initiative, not because the initiative satisfies
the framers' concept of republicanism. Rather, it does not do enough
violence to it to justify federal interference in the affairs of a state.
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 292 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961)
(Madison's direct answer to the Antifederalist claim that the Guarantee Clause would
justify federal interference with peaceful change to state constitutions).
9. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 111-29.
10. See Amar, supra note 2, at 774-77.
11. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 166-243. Federalism aside, even the activists
favored inclusion of blacks within traditionally representative government rather than
any sort of direct democracy or other end run around separation of powers.
12. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
13. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (Guarantee
Clause challenge to initiative nonjusticiable).
1994]
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II.
For argument's sake, assume my previous point is wrong, and
original intent would view the initiative as contrary to the
Guarantee Clause. The wording of the Clause is mandatory, and
some of its history supports a more vigorous federal role. Or note
Judge Linde's view that state courts, less encumbered by concepts of
federalism, can enforce the Clause against their own governments.
If original intent supports Judge Linde and the initiative is
unrepublican, should modern courts therefore invalidate some or all
initiatives, as he urges?14
No. The initiative is an excellent illustration of what is
fundamentally wrong-with Borkism. The device has been with us
since 1898, and its constitutional validity was thoroughly discussed
and tested during its first twenty years. 15  It was consistently
sustained and has been assumed to be valid by almost all Americans
ever since.
We lawyers have all kinds of reasons why the constitutional
validity was not properly tested. Most importantly, the Supreme
Court dodged the merits under the political question doctrine. 16
And its weak opinions on the point were written by one of our more
forgettable jurists, Chief Justice White. Legal academics can flay his
work without breathing hard. As Judge Linde has shown, the
leading case in the Oregon Supreme Court is even easier to put
down.17
However flawed in theory, these decisions are both legal and
practical precedents, now over seventy-five years old. Precedents are
14. In the text, I accept Judge Linde's claim for state courts arguendo, but I am
troubled by it on several grounds. First, the terms of the Guarantee Clause authorize
federal intervention; the Clause is arguably not a self-executing law to be enforced by
any court with jurisdiction. Second, the Supreme Court's holdings that the Clause is
nonjusticiable can be read to say that only Congress can define republican government,
and the courts can enforce only what Congress has enacted, so state courts, like federal,
cannot act absent a federal statute. Third, what if a state initiative attempted to
deprive the state's courts of authority over the question?
15. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 259-69.
16. See Pacific States, 223 U.S. 118; see also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241
U.S. 565 (1916).
17. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not 'Republican
Government: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 24-27 (1993)
(criticizing Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710 (1903)). Chief Justice White's
opinions were joined by Holmes and Hughes; had they written for the Court, we would
have a tougher time of it.
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law, too, the fatal flaw of Borkism. Precedents as well-established as
these are what the public think the law is. They, as much as original
meaning, are the bedrock of the rule of law, the image that a court
finds but does not create law. They are separation of powers at its
most fundamental, between the-lawmaker and the law-applier.
We realist lawyers know all the shortcomings of those images of
precedent and the rule of law. But the public do not. Nor do they
care much whether the Supreme Court reached the merits in Pacific
States, or about any other technical question we might raise. To
them, the initiative is valid. For a court, particularly the Supreme
Court, now to say that it is not would encounter enormous costs in
public respect for the courts. The legal establishment can pull this
off occasionally, as in Brown.18. . But there must be very strong
reasons, again as in Brown. If we do it all the time, the image of the
courts shifts too much to law creators. We have just gone through a
cycle of political reaction. Overturn the initiative and we shall have
another. I don't think the reasons are strong enough. Pacific States
is not Plessy.19
If we take the anti-Borkist view that the Guarantee Clause is for
each generation to reinterpret according to its own circumstances,
the case encounters other obstacles. No generation since has been so
strongly attached to the Constitution's structural protections as the
founders. We have almost entirely substituted judicial review. For
us now to pretend that we are devoted to Madisonian structuralism
is, as Professor Ely would say, a fake. This much is given away by
the assertion in law reviews that because of the political question
doctrine, the Guarantee Clause is a dead letter. Only a modem
American, assuming a huge role for courts, can say that.
Perhaps one might try to distinguish Pacific States by reliance
on our changed view of federalism. As I have said, federalism was an
important reason for cautious use of the Guarantee Clause in Rhode
Island and in sustaining the initiative, even during Reconstruction,
all before 1937. But distinguishing Pacific States this way would add
still another burden to the changes wrought in that year, changes so
basic that Bruce Ackerman labels 1937 a constitutional moment.20
Yet our weakened view of federalism was accomplished without
constitutional amendment, mostly by the judges. It is hard to believe
18. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1965).
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEoPLE 113-14 (Harv. U. Press Paperback 1993).
1994]
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that the public would accept an earlier change in judicial
interpretation as sufficient basis to scuttle the initiative any more
than a new one.i
III.
The Court has always said that Guarantee Clause questions are
nonjusticiable. Or at least they are so until Congress has enforced
the clause; the essential point is probably who can define republican,
Congress or the Court. All four of today's principal papers advocate
overturning that rule. 21 I want to speculate about public attitudes
to raise a question about that position. My point has several prem-
ises, which I must now assemble.
First, discussions of the initiative in writings by Judge Linde,
Professor Eule, Derrick Bell, and others compare it with the work of
legislatures, and the comparison is entirely favorable to legisla-
tures.22 Legislatures hold public hearings, they hear expert evi-
dence, they must listen to the views of Madisonian minorities,
legislation can be redrafted to accommodate minorities' strongest
objections, compromises can be struck, and minorities are protected
by bicameralism and executive veto. There is deliberation before the
final form of an enactment. Some further points can be added, such
as the geographic system of representation, which also blunts
majoritarianism. All of these are bypassed by initiatives, which
enact majority preferences that do not accommodate dissenting views
in any way. Judicial review under the state's constitution is
bypassed when the initiative amends that constitution. Problems of
consent of the governed for Madisonian minorities are acute.
I am sympathetic with these accounts. Many initiative measures
enacted in this country have been quite ugly.23 Had we not federal
judicial review, the record would be foul indeed.
21. See Linde, supra note 3; Amar, supra note 2; Deborah J. Merritt, Republican
Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994) (this issue).
22. See Linde, supra note 17; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democ-
racy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); see also DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 184-85 (1984).
23. See Eule, supra note 22, at 1505 n.5, 1551-52.
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On to my second premise. Recall the popularity of the initiative
despite its shortcomings. Its popularity is rising. Polls tell us that
most Americans would like to have a national initiative.24 Why is
this happening? The standard account is that citizens are fed up
with their representatives and want to bring them to heel.
I am sure this account is part of the picture, but I want to
suggest another factor that may be afoot. Make another comparison,
between the ordinary legislative process and the judicial process.
Again, the legislative process shows compromise, accommodation,
amendment, and the need for three sources of legislative power to
agree. Many clashing interests are accommodated. By contrast, the
judicial process declares winners and losers by a preponderance of
the evidence, or five-four, or a jury's thunderous award 'of punitive
damages. In this important way, the judicial process resembles the
initiative.
End of premises. My speculation is this. The increasing
attractiveness of the initiative may in part be a reaction to the
greatly expanded role of the judiciary. A feature of the modern
judicial role is to heap scorn on the ordinary legislative process.
Legislatures are branded as discriminatory or as procedural klutzes,
as having no respect for individual rights and liberties. For a
prominent example, recall the Supreme Court's gratuitous bashing of
Congress in its Chadha opinion.25 So when citizens turn to the
initiative, they are imitating aspects of judicial review. They are
learning from their betters in the legal profession. The judicial
process has trained them to want to be winners, not compromisers,
and it has trained them to sneer at legislatures. They have followed
our lead in deciding that legislatures are unsatisfactory.
If my speculation is correct, we should question whether the bet-
ter response to problems posed by initiatives is more law. Perhaps it
is the opposite. Perhaps if courts showed more respect for the legis-
lative process and its accommodations and compromises, citizens
would regain some respect for it as well. So I come to a position akin
to Professor Eule's but with a different emphasis. Like him I think
initiatives deserve a closer judicial look than ordinary legislation.2 6
However, I arrive at that view by emphasizing the need for greater
judicial respect for legislatures, rather than by turning up the heat
24. See Eule, supra note 22, at 1507, 1553.
25. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,926-28 (1983).
26. See Eule, supra note 22 at 1584-86.
19941
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on initiatives.
